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Abstract
Much of the urban studies literature on the London Olympics has focused on its social
legacies and the top-down nature of policy agendas. This article explores one element
that has been less well covered — the contractual dynamics and delivery networks that
have shaped infrastructure provision. Drawing on interviews and freedom of information
requests, this article explores the mechanisms involved in the project’s delivery and
their implications for broader understandings of urban politics and policymaking. It
assesses contemporary writings on regulatory capitalism, public–private networks
and new contractual spaces to frame the empirical discussion. This article argues
that the London Olympic model has been characterized by the prioritization of delivery
over representative democracy. Democratic imperatives, such as those around
sustainability and employment rights, have been institutionally re-placed and converted
into contractual requirements on firms. This form of state-led privatization of the
development process represents a new, and for some, potentially more effective mode of
governance than those offered by traditional systems of regulation and management.
Introduction
Critical writing on the London Olympic Games has mainly focused on the position of
communities vis à vis the Games organizers and debates over ‘legacy building’ (see
Vigor et al., 2004; Gold and Gold, 2008; Girginov and Hills, 2009; Poynter, 2009). Much
less has been written on the processes through which the project infrastructure has been
managed, regulated and delivered, and the implications for broader understandings of
urban policy and politics in democratic cities. The logistics involved in establishing
workable contractual relations and procurement structures for a development of this
scale are enormous. It is estimated that the London Games required the drawing up of
over 43,000 contracts, each of which must be compliant with laws and regulations on
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tendering and transparency (Lythaby and Mead, 2011). Thus, while there has been much
focus on the politics of mega events and the neoliberal discourses of development that
underpin them, the practices involved in the day-to-day management of contracts and
structures is often put to one side, and presented as a mere extension of top-down
development logics. This represents a surprising lacuna in the literature given that many
of the policy outcomes associated with the Games, such as those surrounding
sustainability and employment, are being implemented through a utopian top-down
model of contractual management. In this respect the London Games has represented a
new mode of state-led privatization in which public funds and objectives have been
converted into privately run and contractually delivered programmes of action. In
contrast to former Olympics, such as Athens in 2004, the delivery of key infrastructure
has been on time and ‘to budget’, albeit with a budget that has consistently expanded. It
therefore seems likely that the processes involved in contract procurement and project
delivery will feature highly in any future ‘London model’ of development.
For authors such as Braithwaite (2008) and Levi-Faur (2011) such processes reflect
and reproduce a wider shift towards new modes of regulatory capitalism in which
states and corporations have established interconnected policy networks through
which abstract policies are converted into concrete interventions. Traditional modes of
representative accountability and politics, they argue, no longer hold sway in a context
where decisions are increasingly made and implemented through tight-knit regulatory
and contractual practices. Under this new system, democracy has been converted into a
series of debates over how to best regulate the conduct of actors through the creation of
‘communities of shared fate’ in which all public, private and third-sector bodies become
reliant on each other. It is a process, they contend, that is not necessarily detrimental to
democratic governance and a collective sense of ‘public interest’. Ayres and Braithwaite
(2000), for example, points out that if managed carefully, regulation can be made to work
in the cause of more inclusive and socially just forms of capitalism. Policy priorities can
be embedded into a series of formal and informal regulatory ties that force compliance
in ways that other forms of governance are unable to fix.
However, for writers on the critical left such as Swyngedouw (2009) and Wacquant
(2008) the implementation of such practices represents an erosion of the democratic
process. The removal of politics becomes a precondition for the effective implementation
of policy as it enables policymakers to depoliticize development projects, so that
professionals are able to act freely to get on with the process of making development
happen. Governance becomes dominated by a Blairite concern with ‘what matters is
what works’ and as Levi-Faur (2011: 4) notes, it is a process that carries significant
‘liberty costs’ in which there is ‘the quiet accretion of restriction — an accretion hardly
visible because it is hidden behind technical rule-making, mystifying legal doctrine and
complex bureaucracies’. It is a cost that arises from a growing uniformity of action across
the globe in which states and powerful private actors increasingly ‘seek to align and
contain variegation and contestation, by constructing a normative consensus that
professes expertise about how capitalism should be governed and by whom’ (Sheppard
and Leitner, 2010: 186). In effect, states sign away their direct rights and obligations to
direct spending and devolve responsibility for implementation to public–private
networks and contract writers.
This article directly engages with such debates. It draws on research carried out on the
delivery of infrastructure for the London Games and the role of regulatory practices in
influencing the form and character of development. The work involved two elements:
interviews with key policymakers and project managers at the Olympic Delivery
Authority (ODA) and a series of detailed analyses of contracts and delivery tools, many
of which have been released through freedom of information requests by the author and
others. It explores the ways in which a policy focus on ‘delivery’ has been converted
into a series of regulatory structures, underpinned by contracts that are designed to
institutionalize policy outcomes and the mechanisms through which they are to be
achieved. The discussion documents the mobilization of a shared community of fate
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surrounding the Games and the role of procurement and contractual strategies in shaping
policy implementation on the ground. It explores the innovative nature of much of
this work, particularly in the establishment of contractual packages surrounding the
development of project infrastructure. It also examines the partnerships that have been
established and the ways in which global networks have been mobilized. Collectively,
it argues that while certain features of the Games make it ‘unique’, it would be wrong
to overemphasize its separation from broader changes in the ways in which states
and corporations now operate. These wider trends have profound and under-researched
implications for democratic practices in cities and contemporary forms of urban
policy. The article calls for a broader awareness of how such mechanisms shape urban
development programmes and their impacts on people and places. The first section
analyses key writings on the rise of regulatory capitalism and urban politics. This is
followed by a discussion of the coming of the London Games, procurement strategies
and processes, and public–private hybridities.
The rise of regulatory capitalism and regulatory states
Much of the writing on regulatory states has emerged from a creeping realization that there
is a paradox underpinning neoliberalism. As Braithwaite (2008: xi) argues, it has become
clear that ‘while the state was running fewer things, it was regulating more of them, and
spending ever higher proportions of its budget on regulation’. This is particularly
surprising given that ‘the rise of neo-liberalism was supposed to result in deregulation, the
retreat of the state, and the triumph of markets and business interests’ (Jordana and
Levi-Faur, 2005: 110). Authors such as John Braithwaite have termed this the rise of
‘regulatory capitalism’or a context in which there is ‘increased delegation to business and
professional self-regulation and to civil society, to intra-national and international
networks of regulatory experts, and increased regulation of the state by the state, much of
it regulation through and for competition’ (ibid.: 11; see also Levi-Faur and Gilad, 2004).
The result is that ‘not only political science is an anachronism, but public law as something
separate from private law and private self-interest is equally so’ (Braithwaite, 1999: 90).
There are three elements to these arguments that are relevant to the discussion of
the London Olympics in this article. First, they challenge the idea that state practices under
neoliberalism represent anything like what Braithwaite terms the ‘fairytale’ of
deregulation and minimal government so commonly espoused by commentators and
social scientists. Braithwaite (2008: 8) points out that even during the Reagan presidency,
a period that is often characterized as the high-water mark of neoliberalism, ‘business
regulatory agencies had resumed the long-run growth in the size of their budgets, the
numbers of their staff, the toughness of their enforcement, and the numbers of pages of
regulatory laws foisted upon business’. Similar trends have emerged elsewhere. In a study
of 16 policy sectors in 49 countries, Jordana and Levi-Faur (2005) show that despite the
rhetoric of liberalization, governments have expanded the number and power of regulatory
agencies, creating on average 20 or so bodies per year per country during the 1990s and
2000s. Paradoxically, this expansion is primarily a consequence of increased privatization
and liberalization. It is a situation that goes beyondAndrew Gamble’s (1988) observations
on the paradoxes of Thatcherism in which top-down state power was mobilized to promote
a ‘free economy’. Instead, it reflects a structural process in which the hollowing out of
traditional forms of state power is compensated for by the expansion of regulatory
institutions, rules and practices (see Moran, 2003; Levi-Faur, 2005). It is an approach that
builds on work by authors such as Clarke (2008) and Power (1999) who argue that modern
governance is embedded into an ‘audit society’ characterized by a lack of trust in the
practices of public and private sector organizations and reduced tolerance of perceived
risks and failures. It is a reality in which state practices become increasingly focused on
rulemaking, new technologies, the formalization of codes and ‘less ad hoc discretion to
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individual auditors in their relationships with auditees’ (Levi-Faur, 2005: 13). According
to this group of writers, this combination of changes reflects how modern governance
works in practice, as opposed to the eloquent neoliberal imaginaries of political economic
authors (e.g. England and Ward, 2007; Wacquant, 2008). It seems to provide ‘a solution to
the inherent tension between the demands of the capitalist order and democracy’ (Jordana
and Levi-Faur, 2005: 112).
Second, regulatory capitalism is characterized by the emergence of new public–
private hybridities in the development and implementation of policy interventions. The
rise of regulatory capitalism has gone hand in hand with an expansion in the size and scale
of multinational corporations (MNCs). While critics of corporate power point to the ability
of MNCs to transcend state boundaries and use geographical scales to undermine the
regulatory capacities of states and citizens (see Harvey, 2009), advocates of regulatory
capitalism point to the substantial regulatory opportunities that a more powerful corporate
sector opens up for contemporary states. By working with big businesses, state agencies
are able to establish clear lines of influence, regulation and accountability in ways that are
impossible to achieve when working with communities of small businesses, citizens and
communities. In this way new forms of governance interdependence emerge in which the
‘state’s capacity to govern is actually extended by its capabilities to enlist through
negotiation the governance capabilities of others’ (Braithwaite, 2008: 26). As Braithwaite
notes, in many sectors, MNCs actively lobby for enhanced regulation and tighter
inspection regimes so that smaller, competitor firms are driven out of business.At the same
time, however, states can also use MNCs to regulate and police the networks of suppliers
and smaller firms that service them, thus facilitating an extension in indirect state power.
It can use regulatory threats to cajole actors into ‘communities of shared fate’ in which it
is made clear that the failure to meet specific objectives in any part of the network will
result in the collective regulatory punishment for all. In Braithwaite’s (1999: 92) terms, the
‘logical’ structure of regulation is one where ‘everyone becomes a guardian of everyone
else’ (ibid.: 93), along with the abandonment of ‘hierarchical accountability architectures
that bind willingness to take responsibility for making a contribution’ (ibid.: 94).
Therefore, it overcomes the problem identified by Hayek, among others, who argued that
top-down bureaucratic management can never regulate practices at the micro scale (see
Riles, 2008; Scharpf, 1999). But it also carries potentially enormous implications for
traditional and common sense ways of viewing the governance process, many of which are
based on what Michael Waltzer (1984) termed the ‘liberal art of separation’, or the creation
of binary distinctions such as public/private or state/individual. If new hybrids are
emerging in which private actors regulate on behalf of states, and in turn are regulated by
those same states, then notions of democratic accountability through representation lose
their salience. In Levi-Faur’s (2005: 13) sober terms:
we could now be experiencing a transformation from representative democracy to indirect
representative democracy. Democratic governance is no longer about the delegation of
authority to elected representatives but a form of second-level indirect representative
democracy — citizens elect representatives who control and supervise experts who formulate
and administer policies in an autonomous fashion from their regulatory bastions.
And third, the rise of regulatory state practices has emerged at the same time as the
expansion of what Yeatman (1995) terms a new contractualism in which governance is
increasingly organized and managed through legally binding contract writing (see
Ramia, 2002). Contracts have become the sine non qua of regulation and require the
costly mobilization and empowerment of experts, including lawyers and consultants,
many of whom then become bound up in networks of regulation and delivery themselves.
Contracts also facilitate the creation of new financial and political geographies as
multinational investors seek to capture lucrative state contracts as a source of low-risk
revenue. For Richard Murphy (2011: 30) such trends have profound implications as they
create the spaces through which new international private elites emerge that aim to secure
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‘irrevocable contractual claims over taxation revenues that they will manage henceforth
in their own private companies, which they claim will undertake the tasks of the state so
much better than the state could do itself’. Roles previously undertaken by the state
are increasingly being handed over to regulated private operators, under a process of
state-led privatization. Many of these providers are funded by unaccountable (and
under-researched) global investment funds and holding companies. Indeed, as Colin
Crouch (2011) recently noted, orthodox theories of government and governance have
failed to register the rise of giant corporate regulators and the growing irrelevance of
traditional distinctions between markets and states. These insights on regulation and
governance are particularly relevant to developments in urban policy in which there has
been a growing tendency towards the production of flagship projects and entrepreneurial
urban strategies. This article now turns to a discussion of these projects.
Delivering ﬂagship urban projects
The politics of urban development has undergone seemingly contradictory trends in
recent decades. On the one hand there has been an international emphasis, promoted by
the UN, powerful governments, non-governmental organizations and others on ‘good
governance’ models of devolution, community empowerment and democratization.
Across the global North and South urban policymakers have adopted such language and
used it to legitimate wider moves towards sustainability and placemaking (see Imrie and
Raco, 2003; Giddens, 2009). There is a wider call for new forms of smart governance in
which old-fashioned Keynesian modes of intervention and ways of thinking are seen as
outdated and out of touch with new realities. Planning systems, for example, are often
presented in these terms. They are seen as policy relics that limit development and
progress in fast-moving cities and societies. Top-down state bureaucracies that seek to
reduce the risks faced by citizens are characterized as outmoded and of a bygone era. The
new reality is one of empowered citizens taking a greater role in the coproduction of
urban policy. In Giddens’ (2007: 212) terms, so-called progressive policy now ‘aims to
provide resources that will empower citizens, but also to work with them to ensure that
the desired outcomes are achieved’.
Simultaneously, however, governments and city authorities are also embarking
on projects that they hope will stimulate new growth by attracting inward investment
and creative class workers (see Kipfer and Keil, 2002; Peck, 2005). There has been a
tendency to embark on big-scale programmes that require infrastructure of enormous
technical and regulatory complexity. International finance is relatively easily obtained
from private investors who are all too willing to take a greater stake in low-risk,
‘public-backed’ projects. The main problem often lies in the (in)compatibility of
development priorities. As authors such as Flyvbjerg et al. (2003) and Crouch (2011)
have pointed out, private investors usually push for legally binding contracts in which
there are reduced risks for them and guaranteed returns. The longer term and the less
flexible the agreed contracts are, the better. Democratic demands become recharacterized
as a ‘threat’ or a ‘risk’ to future investment returns and the obvious logic is for private
companies to use regulations and contracts to insulate themselves from socio-political
demands. The language of risk management becomes a priority, with expert advisers
used to predict and cost all manner of possible eventualities. For Cutler (2010: 178), this
inexorably leads to a process in ‘which experts participate in creating their own markets
by identifying ever new risks to manage with their expertise’. Their enrolment into urban
development processes represents part of the accretion of expert influence highlighted by
Levi-Faur above and the growing liberty costs of high-profile project delivery.
In some cases this politics of democratic insulation is also used by public actors to
shield themselves from political demands. There may be advantages in signing away
direct control over controversial urban policy projects so that criticisms are deflected
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onto development partnerships and unaccountable and unresponsive delivery agents.
Decisions may also be ideological and founded on a genuine belief that state actors are
unable to deliver the same levels of efficiency as those found in the private sector (see
Giddens, 2009; Blair, 2010). The more complex the project and the greater the levels of
regulatory expertise required, the more likely it is that global multinationals will be able
to offer attractive ‘solutions’ that work through complexities and deliver. This de facto
involves a sorting process as only a small number of major, multinational developers
have the capacity and the proven track record to be able to take on major development
contracts.
Increased regulatory complexity also has broader effects. As Bentley and Rafferty
(1992) argue, it results in new forms of contractual ‘packaging’ in which projects are
subdivided and broken up into vertically organized, deliverable units. State institutions
then act as project commissioners and set the parameters for projects through regulations
and objectives. To make projects more manageable, regulations and contracts are used
to appoint ‘gate-keeper’ private organizations and project managers. They, in turn,
subcontract out their activities to a range of businesses who report upwards through a
hierarchy of reciprocal payments and responsibilities. These gate keepers will usually be
MNCs specializing in construction management. Their deployment represents a
rescaling of political power in which we see ‘the incipient formation of a [new] type of
authority and state practice’ (Sassen, 2002: 91).
For optimistic commentators these forms of governance may open up opportunities
for the (re)regulation of corporate practices and priorities by elected state actors and the
publics they represent. States may be able to weave progressive policy objectives into
the fabric of urban projects in ways that would not be possible without the regulated
involvement of property developers, architects and financiers. It is not only citizens and
states who face limited room for manoeuvre in the wake of contractual ‘lock in’,
but also professionals and technical experts who may be compelled to deliver on
the demands made by social groups and politicians. While Levi-Faur (2011) may be
correct in highlighting some of the liberty costs associated with this wider conversion
of state authorities into intelligent clients, the same process could be read, in more
optimistic terms, as a retooling of the state. Research on architecture firms by authors
such as Imrie and Street (2009), for example, has shown how regulations influence
the mentalities and practices of architects in relation to themes, such as the accessibility
and sustainability of building design. Urban policy programmes may be able to insist
on the delivery of broader priorities through the use of regulations. Moreover, failure
to deliver on these demands could result in contractual penalties or the removal of
a private operator altogether. This, it could be argued, represents a specific form
of policy delivery that is ‘effective’ and transparent as it sets out clear targets,
monitoring frameworks and timetables of action. Democratic control within such a
system is transferred to those overseeing and writing the contracts and this, again,
while closing down some terrains of democratic accountability, also serves to open up
others.
It is in this broader context that the article now turns to the example of the London
Olympic Games 2012. The Games represents a salient example of such processes in
action and the discussion examines the ways in which the development has unfolded. It
draws on interviews with policymakers at the ODA and documentary/contractual
analysis to explore the core delivery mechanisms that have been established and the ways
in which they operate. It examines how policy programmes are governed and managed
through regulatory networks of problem identification, project commissioning and
procurement. It argues that such examples shed light on the contemporary character of
state practices and democratic modes of accountability, and how urban governance
processes are being reconfigured and transformed by the growing imperative in many
contexts to ‘get things done’ and deliver ‘on time’ and ‘to budget’. The discussion begins
by exploring the coming of the Olympics and the significant governance challenges it
raised for development agencies. It then examines the regulatory spaces and networks
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that were established to deliver and manage the Games, and the ways in which processes
of governance were privatized from an early stage.
The coming of the Games
The successful acquisition of the London 2012 Games represented a significant
achievement for development agencies and policymakers in London and the UK. The
bidding process has been discussed in detail elsewhere (see Gold and Gold, 2008;
Poynter, 2009) but from the outset one of its key stated objectives was the creation of
development legacies in and around east London and the establishment of lasting benefits
for local communities. Thus, for the London Assembly (2007: 4) the Games will only be
successful if they bring about a ‘transformation in the life chances of London’s most
deprived communities’. The project dwarfs other initiatives and skews broader spatial
patterns of spending on urban policy in the UK. By 2012 at least £10 billion of public
money will have been expended on the Games and possibly much more given the costs,
such as security, that come from other budgets. This compares with resources devoted to
other flagship urban programmes, such as the £2 billion allocated to the New Deal for
Communities programme over 13 years (1997–2010) or the approximately £1 billion
spent on the government’s post-2003 Pathfinder Housing Scheme in northern cities.
As research in cities such as Barcelona and Athens has shown, the Olympics
represents a particular example of urban regeneration policy in action in which the
considerations that affect projects elsewhere are amplified to a higher degree (see
Gospodini, 2009). Unlike other, more open-ended developments, they have a set
timeframe by which projects have to be delivered, whatever the extent of local planning
and infrastructural challenges to be overcome. They also have visions that are relatively
fixed and created, primarily, for the consumption of an external international body, the
International Olympic Committee (IOC), with its own rules and requirements. Once an
Olympic project is underway, there is a political imperative for it to be delivered,
whatever the objections of local and extra-local interests. Market considerations are also
rather different. Sponsorship agreements with national and international firms are fixed
early and, in the case of the London Games, the key sponsors were already in place by
May 2008. Development projects are signed and sealed after the event has been won and,
while changing market and credit conditions have an impact on the trajectories of
development, they are unlikely to derail an Olympic project entirely or stop development
going ahead given the investment of political capital by governments and development
agencies. As the Beijing Games of 2008 also demonstrated, there is nothing intrinsically
democratic about ‘successful’ Olympic development planning (see Meyer, 2008), a fact
that is particularly significant in east London where there has been a long history of
comprehensive regeneration and local political activism (see Brownill and Kochan,
2011). Indeed, as other studies have shown, Olympic bids can form a key part of a wider
set of development agendas in which cities and countries look to boost their global
credentials or rollout wider political programmes (for the example of Toronto, see Tufts,
2003). The Vancouver Games of 2010, for example, was underpinned by a neoliberal
privatization model. As Surborg et al. (2008: 345) showed, place-bound investments in
the Olympics were used to tie ‘local processes into wider economic circuits’ that involve
‘locally grounded elites as well as transnational actors’. The same team of authors also
argued that neoliberal imaginations of business-led projects were used to try and
establish wider ‘legacies’ and impacts on themes such as social inclusion and legacy
building (VanWynsberghe et al., 2012; see also Olds, 1998).
In practical terms, the London Games presented policymakers with particular
difficulties. It is one of the most complex development spaces in Europe, with
responsibilities and resources fragmented between a myriad of public and private sector
interests. The chosen Olympic site represented a challenging location for development as
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it possessed a vibrant community of small businesses and a range of landowners (see
Raco and Tunney, 2010). Development agencies faced similar challenges to those found
in Athens in 2004, in which a complex urban landscape formed the backdrop to
investment plans. There was widespread resistance in Athens to a top-down model of
development and the organizers were widely criticized by the IOC and other powerful
international organizations for their apparent ‘inefficiency’ and their failure to create
‘business-friendly’ models of development. The city’s limitations were equated with
too much ‘politics’ and the important role given to local planners and experts who
were seeking to protect public spaces and public interests. The production of what
Beriatos and Gospodini (2004) term ‘glocalized’ landscapes in the city resulted from the
combination of global expertise, local planning interventions, state practices and local
political traditions. This glocalization came at a price in terms of damage to the city’s
(and Greece’s) reputation with international investors and the perception that the IOC’s
decision-making processes had failed to adequately account for such ‘risks’. Future
Games would have to be less political and insulated as much as possible from ‘local’
demands.
The argument was increasingly made that the less ‘political’ a Games can be, the more
likely that its delivery will be on time and to budget. It should be converted, if possible,
into a technocratic process of project management and delivery. It was for this reason that
during the bidding stage governments and opposition parties are required to sign
agreements ‘guaranteeing’ that in the event of changes in leadership between the
awarding and hosting of the Games, there will be no changes to commitments. The
democratic process is thus suspended and replaced by contractual agreements that freeze
the commitments of policymakers and citizens to those made at a particular moment in
time. The recent publication of the IOC’s (2010a) files on ‘candidate cities’ candidly
reveals that:
The Commission believes that having such agreements in place before the election of the Host
City is a positive factor in so far as they set out the framework for the planning and organisation
of the Games, thus facilitating the transition to and formation of the Organising Committee
(ibid.: 30).
Cities are required to demonstrate ‘popular support’ for their candidature during the
bidding phase and, as was demonstrated in cities like Vancouver, there is little tolerance
of dissent (Toronto Star, 2010). The Olympic Charter (IOC, 2010b) also makes it clear
that visible political disagreement is to be controlled during any games. Thus ‘no
speeches of any kind may be held by any representative of any government or other
public authority, nor by any other politician, in any venue placed under the responsibility
of the Organising Committee’ (ibid.: 103). All efforts are directed at reducing the ‘risks’
posed by democratic demands. This is particularly significant for the London Games
that, for many private companies, represents a model site in which to demonstrate the
effectiveness of new forms of project management and regulatory capitalism in action. It
was clear from the outset that it possessed huge reputational capital for the spreading of
development models to other cities around the world.
In addition, this push for private managerialism has been facilitated by the strict
regulatory and contractual requirements set down by the IOC and other supranational
bodies such as the EU. The former has an extremely powerful grip over all aspects of the
Games. Its original contract for the 2012 Olympics, written in 2005, sets out a series of
legally binding commitments on all aspects of planning and development. It is clear that
the risks are being transferred to local organizations, whose responsibility is to ensure
that regulatory structures are put in place that will facilitate private and public sector
investment. The contract states, for example, that:
The City, the National Olympic Committee and the Organising Committee shall be jointly and
severally liable for all commitments entered into individually or collectively concerning the
planning, organization and staging of the Games, including for all obligations deriving from
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this Contract, excluding the financial responsibility for the planning, organization and staging
of the Games, which shall be entirely assumed, jointly and severally, by the City and the
OCOG’ (IOC, 2005: 11).
The IOC also points out that in the event of any failure on the part of local organizers to
deliver the contract as set out, ‘the IOC may take legal action against the City, the NOC
and/or the OCOG, as the IOC deems fit’ (ibid.: 11). All liabilities relating to the Games
will be borne by the host city authorities, who were forced to sign a contract stating that
it would waive its right to make any claims against:
the IOC, its officers, members, directors, employees, consultants, agents and other
representatives, for any damages, including all costs, resulting from all acts or omissions of the
IOC relating to the Games, as well as in the event of any performance, non-performance,
violation or termination of this Contract (ibid.: 12).
Alongside these legal protections, the IOC has drawn up an Olympic charter, a host city
contract and specific technical manuals to ‘set in place a set of guidelines which will
establish the rules and regulations to which all parties involved in Games planning and
operations must adhere’ (IOC, 2005: 46). Through legal contracts and changes in national
legislation it forces policymakers in cities to adopt a ‘management approach’ that ‘seeks
to minimise potential risks while maximising the available opportunities’ (ibid.: 47).
Owing to the scale of potential risks, games management becomes a ‘unique and
complex task involving many organisations’ thus ‘an effective partnership between the
[city] Organisers and the IOC is critical’ (ibid.: 48). These partnerships require the
inclusion of private sector consultancy expertise and companies such as New World
Consulting and PriceWaterhouseCoopers who have acted as core ‘advisers’ and
facilitators of partnership practices for the IOC and whose management discourses are
evident throughout the documents. This managerial/technical approach to what are,
in effect, politically contentious interventions when applied to cities as complex as
London is best summed up in the compulsory games planning process that runs from
foundational planning → strategic planning → operational planning → testing →
operational readiness (ibid.: 114–15). The early phases of this process set out plans that
will ‘ensure’ that delivery authorities are able to capture and mobilize the resources and
skills of key private sector development authorities. They are supplemented by master
schedules and integrated risk management programmes designed principally by the
‘need to address many foreseen and unforeseen issues. These should be identified,
analysed and managed as risks in advance, so as to prevent or mitigate them’ (ibid.: 207).
The process of risk identification, prevention and monitoring is to be formalized and
regulated by city and national governments. The IOC insists, for example, that ‘to ensure
the accuracy of the information provided, it is important that Planning and Coordination
Function personnel carry out this monitoring and reporting as far as possible
independently, without relying solely on information provided by the various [L]OCOG
functions’ (IOC, 2005: 206). The local organizers are required to establish independent
knowledge management programmes and the production of games knowledge reports to
ensure consistency in the process. The push for ‘independence’ and technical proficiency
results in the mobilization of formal regulatory practices that de facto structure key
governance functions and arrangements. Only a select number of global firms have the
capacity and experience to provide such ‘independent’ services, thus by default limiting
the degree of openness within such networks and who will be incorporated into them.
While such practices are relatively ‘hidden’ in relation to contemporary debates over
Olympic legacies and the building of infrastructure, these IOC documents play a key role
in judicializing and regulating policy interventions.
The UK government also agreed to sign away its ownership of the Games with the
passing of the London Olympic and Paralympic Games Act in 2006, a legal framework
that enshrined the IOC’s regulatory demands into English law. The Act set out the
fundamental institutional, legal and political structures that must be established before a
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Games is allowed to go ahead and this, in turn, propagates self-selecting networks of
private sector actors who depend on states expanding their regulatory requirements for
development projects. This is in line with the Olympic Charter (2010), which explicitly
calls for political guarantees in which the organizing committee ‘must preserve their
autonomy and resist all pressures of any kind, including but not limited to political, legal,
religious or economic pressures which may prevent them from complying with the
Olympic Charter’ (ibid.: 62).
In the next section the discussion turns to some of the institutional structures that have
emerged to deliver the London Games and implement some of the wider objectives
encapsulated in the IOC’s broader regulatory and policy structures.
Reframing the governance of development: delivery and
procurement management in the London Olympics
To oversee the implementation of the Games an Olympic Delivery Authority was
established in 2006. Its contractual obligation was to manage a Programme of investment
defined as a:
portfolio of Projects and activities that are required for the delivery of venues, facilities,
infrastructure and transport on time for the London 2012 Olympic Games and Paralympic
Games that are fit-for-purpose, in a way that maximises the delivery of a sustainable legacy
within the available budget (ODA, 2007: 6).
The ODA took on the powers of the planning authority for the Olympic Park and its
primary objectives were ‘to: buy, sell and hold land; make arrangements for building
works and develop transport and other infrastructure; develop a Transport Plan for the
Games, with which other agencies must cooperate; and make orders regulating traffic on
the Olympic Road Network’ (see ODA, 2011a: 1).
The decision to establish a delivery authority is indicative of the governance approach
to the Games and the displacement of democratically elected bodies. The ODA was a
quango1 body, made up of appointees and a contracted workforce. It was managed by a
board consisting of representatives from a range of business interests, along with a trade
union member and others with expertise in the creative industries and voluntary sectors.
Its establishment was in large part a reflection of the IOC’s ‘technical’ requirement that
an agency be put in place that could override opposition and local practical barriers (such
as fragmented land ownership) and ensure that governance became a process of delivery
management. There was no attempt to hand over planning powers to local authorities.
The ODA worked alongside the London Development Agency, under the control of the
Mayor of London, to clear the site and prepare it for the Games’ infrastructure. By 2005
there was no longer any need to engage in democratic discussion; the focus instead was
on mobilizing networks to put the Games in place.
The ODA was presented with a challenging role. Its first task was to create the
institutional capacities needed to deliver the Games’ infrastructure. A London Thames
Gateway Development Corporation existed in the area but its powers were relatively
circumscribed and it was in no position to deliver the infrastructure required for a project
of this scale. However, as a new body with limited capacities, the ODA was in a similar
position. From the outset it looked to private sector consultants and contractors to
provide the necessary capabilities to get work completed. Such firms form part of a
global network with a vested interest in the spread of major property-led development
projects. Access to freedom of information sources reveals the broader scope and
remarkable complexity of the ODA’s consultancy arrangements in the early phases of
the Olympic development. It spent £30.7 million between 2006 and 2009 on 112 separate
1 A quango is an acronym for a quasi-autonomous non-governmental organization.
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contracts. In 2006 alone £11.843 million was given out to just seven companies,
including a payment of £1.8 million to global accountants KPMG, £2.3 million to the
multinational services group Turner & Townsend Ltd and £2.8 million to Hedra Plc, a
consultancy firm that advises on business and procurement services.2 The list also
includes IT specialists, such as Fujitsu Services who received a payment of £5.8 million
in 2007 for ‘back office systems and services’, and £1.2 million to QI Consulting, a
business management consultancy group. The list reveals how the formation of a ‘state’
delivery agency, such as the ODA, rapidly becomes a lucrative business opportunity for
the global financial and businesses services industry and reflects the shifts towards
‘regulatory capitalism’ outlined earlier. Contractors are called upon to provide both the
hardware and software required for a new organization, particularly one that is time
limited and has to conform to a complex array of statutory and legal requirements. The
existence of an ‘off-the-shelf’ set of ‘solutions’ provided by contracted out expert firms
is a key element in the rolling out of regulatory capitalism (see Francis and Yu, 2007).
These changes go hand in hand with reformed organizational practices that place
greater emphasis on the working relationships among individuals, institutions and
organizations. It generates forms of self selection in the recruitment of key individuals
and those in top managerial posts. In December 2005, for example, the European CEO
of Goldman Sachs, Paul Deighton, was appointed as LOCOG’s CEO in large part
because of ‘his experience in leading large teams of people in complex and diverse
environments’ (Coe, 2005: 1). In September 2012 Deighton took up a post as a
government minister for ‘economic development’. In 2005 Ernst and Young Accountant
David Leather was seconded to the Interim ODA as chief finance officer. A government
written answer in 2008 confirmed that this was part of a wider role given to the firm in
establishing the ODA in which it was paid £8,344,509 between 2005 and 2007 for the
‘provision of financial advisory services and interim staff to the ODA, prior to the
recruitment of permanent ODA finance staff’ (Hansard, 2008). Such exchanges of
personnel and knowledge represent an under-researched element of regulatory structures
and regulatory capitalism, yet they play a key part in facilitating the governance
frameworks that support urban development.
But most significantly, the ODA effectively privatized the delivery process within a
year of being formed by appointing a consortium to act as a delivery manager to oversee
the project. The contract was taken up in 2006 by a new private company named CLM
Ltd, consisting of three multinational project management companies: CH2M Hill,
Laing O’Rourke and Mace (four consortiums were shortlisted). As the Mayor of London
at the time stated, ‘with CLM we have a team with a fantastic track record on key projects
in London and all over the world. They have a breadth of experience that will be key to
delivering the best games’. ODA made it clear that CLM’s initial selection was, in part,
a result of Laing O’Rourke and Mace’s existing work on projects such as Heathrow’s
Terminal 5. Details of the processes through which the project management contract
was awarded have been withheld from public scrutiny on the grounds of ‘commercial
confidentiality’, but it is clear that the ‘proven’ track record of these companies meant
that the awarding of key contracts was, to some extent, a process driven by what one
interviewee at ODA termed a ‘naturally self-selecting’ group in that ‘only a small number
of organizations have the capacity to carry out big projects, they get a track record and
then the next project that comes up, they get it’.
The scope and scale of CLM’s responsibilities are presented in Table 1. Taken as a
whole, they represent quite a remarkable transfer of governance activities to a private
sector company.3 They include financial management of the project, management of
the supply chain, production of detailed plans for all aspects of the development, and
2 It has since become part of the multinational Mouchel Group.
3 The information for Table 1 comes from a copy of the Contract between CLM and the ODA that was
released under a freedom of information request, reference RF100526.
186 Mike Raco
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 38.1
© 2013 The Author. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. 9600
Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main St, Malden, MA 02148, USA on behalf of Urban Research
Publications Limited
Table 1 The services which CLM has been tasked to provide
Task/Responsibility Description
Strategy Provision of advice and expertise in development of high-level strategy
making for the Olympic programme
Management
structures
Development of compatible and appropriate working methods, lines of
communication and working procedures with those of the ODA
Transition
arrangements
Assisting ODA to transition CLM’s services into those of the ODA
Work breakdown and
procurement
Advice on and provision of the most appropriate work breakdown structure
and procurement strategy for each element of the project
Value for money Development and implementation of appropriate policies that provide value
for money and optimize whole life costing and quality
Approvals Advising ODA in the provision of statutory approvals and required
notiﬁcations
Quality Assisting ODA to meet its objective on quality of project delivery
Construction Management of construction in conjunction with contractors for the
programme
Design Managing the design process in conjunction with the ODA and coordinating
teams of contractors
Time schedules Preparation of design, construction and commissioning programmes,
including regular revision and review
Communications Provision of information to enable ODA to communicate with wider media
and communities
Budgets Reviewing and commenting on budgets prepared by the ODA, including the
higher level overall programme budgets and those associated with
individual projects
Financial management Provision of cost planning, budgeting, estimating, monitoring, forecasting,
reporting, managing and controlling costs, assets and liabilities associated
with and arising from the design, construction and commissioning process,
including value for money, ﬁnancial management and control and the
timely provision of accurate information
Occupational health
and safety
Ensuring that appropriate provision is made for performance of statutory
functions required on the programme associated with health and safety
Industrial relations Assisting ODA in the development, implementation and monitoring of
performance against an industrial relations strategy
Supply chain Management of the supply chain including providing forecasting and
monitoring of workforce requirements necessary to meet the intended
programme and make proposals for overcoming identiﬁed shortcomings
Material management Strategies to overcome shortages of materials and ensure a steady ﬂow of
relevant materials. CLM to advise ODA on sources of supply, contractual
arrangements and potential opportunities for cost savings
Sustainability Development and implementation of plans to manage consultants’ and
contractors’ performance against the employer’s sustainability objectives
and targets . . . including the development, implementation and monitoring
of a sustainable procurement programme
Information technology Providing information management, systems, technologies and services to
the ODA
Security Liaising over all security arrangements
Archiving Helping to establish archiving systems of key data
Source: ODA (2006)
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governance responsibilities for activities such as ‘project level interfaces’ with third party
organizations (ODA, 2006: 104). CLM also plays a direct role in ‘the management of
applications for approval to other organizations in such a way that the design and
construction process is not hindered’ (ibid.: 104), making them key players in local
politics and decision-making structures. It becomes their responsibility to engage with
the range of partners involved in the delivery of the Olympics, with the ODA taking on
a facilitating role.
The boundaries between decision making and delivery have thus become increasingly
blurred. CLM acts as both an adviser to the ODA and the organization responsible for the
delivery of its programmes. Under contract it ‘manages all aspects of cost planning,
budgeting, and estimating, forecasting, reporting, managing and controlling all of the
costs, assets, and liabilities associated with, and arising from, design, construction,
and commissioning process’ (ibid.: 105). Its duty is to inform subcontractors of the
regulatory requirements of being an Olympic body and it acts in a ‘gatekeeper’ role as
both a client and a manager of the development process. CLM prepares briefs, terms and
fee structures for all contracts and it publishes details of procurement practices, including
those that go to the Official Journal of the European Union for significant tenders. It can
then ‘review, appraise and report on tenders received for each project and recommends
acceptance as appropriate . . . and negotiates on behalf of the ODA with the supply chain’
(ibid.: 106). Moreover, it aims to ‘manage the performance of the ODA’s designers and
contractors to achieve sustainable development objectives . . . support designers and
contractors to understand and to deliver sustainability through training, and ensure
that all staff working on the Projects has an awareness of sustainability objectives’
(ibid.: 116).
The rolling out of governance by delivery network in this way requires the
establishment of a control structure that delegates responsibility down the contractual
chain, to create what one interviewee termed ‘a cascade of obligations’. There were two
elements to this strategy. First it was decided to split the tasks associated with the
development of the site and infrastructure and to establish substantial contractual
‘packages’ for the development. These became known as tier 1 level contracts and 1,433
of these were awarded by the ODA. In the words of an ODA manager:
the packaging process is key. We didn’t start off contracting at a low level, we recognized early
on that the best way of managing risks and mobilizing suppliers and dealing with commercial
risk was tier 1 contracts, which is what we decided to do. So a lot of the opening up of the
supply chain happens further down.
Below this, 7,500 tier 2 contracts were awarded for smaller but still significant projects.
Thousands of much smaller subcontracting contracts were also signed, bringing the
overall total to approximately 43,000. The quantitative scale of contracting out makes
CLM more than just a partner organization. Its responsibilities are such that it has
become a central component of the institutional structures governing the Games, and its
actions will play a key part in efforts to meet policy objectives and legacy-building
commitments.
This relates to a second part of the ODA’s approach; the setting of strong rules
and associated risks and rewards for gatekeeper organizations and subcontractors. Its
procurement strategy, in the words of one ODA officer, quickly became ‘used to create
new relationships with partners and making sure that they influence the outcomes of their
performance’. The strategy explicitly states that:
The ODA will not simply award contracts according to lowest price but will take into
consideration its broader objectives and values. Ahead of every contract competition the
ODA will develop a ‘balanced scorecard’ of selection and award criteria that will inform
companies of the commercial and technical factors their bids will be scored against (ODA,
2007: 4).
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The ‘balanced scorecard’ approach is broken down into five core elements as listed in
Table 2. It aims ‘to spread its objectives and values through their sub-contractors and
supply chains’ (ibid.: 6). Or in the words of one ODA interviewee, ‘the suppliers have to
respond to this and tell us in their contractual pledges how they are planning to respond
to our issues . . . to give us what we need for delivery . . . Without these guarantees they
don’t get the contract’. This has been particularly important for the awarding of tier 1
contracts, with contracting out becoming a form of devolved governance. Thus the ODA
applies ‘its scorecard to the procurement of tier one contracts’ and asks contractors to
keep the ODA informed of how their suppliers and subcontractors perform on the same
objectives (ODA, 2008: 6).
The use of rewards and threats has been the cornerstone of ODA’s activities in all
areas. For example, in its Sustainable Development Strategy (ODA, 2007: 28), it states
that:
Tier-1 contractors will be required to have environmental management systems and
environmental management plans in place prior to work commencing. Subcontractors will
either be required to have these systems in place or to operate within the systems of the ODA
or its Tier-1 contractors.
Similarly in relation to the threat of poor performance on the part of contractors or
the risk of insolvency, the ODA’s proactive response has been to establish a supply
chain management schedule that requires CLM to make a series of checks on contractors
prior to the ‘approval of all Tier-2 contracts’ (Lythaby and Mead, 2011: 3). Potential
contractors were required to produce performance schedules, full cost impact
assessments of potential risks, and quality performance strategies. CLM is required
to ensure that full ‘credit and financial checks’ are made through an elaborate range
of regulatory procedures and methods of accounting. All companies had to provide
evidence of their credit worthiness and submit spending plans and accounts to CLM for
vetting, along with strategies outlining what would happen in the event of bankruptcy.
Active monitoring of contractors is also carried out with CLM overseeing the activities
of ‘over 80 Tier-1 contracts and 2,700 “critical” packages of work across the Park and
Athletes’ Village for indicators of both risk and opportunity’ (Lythaby and Mead, 2011:
13). CLM claims that on 403 occasions it has intervened in supplier practices owing to
a perceived increased level of risk.
The extent of interaction arguably goes beyond a ‘partnership’ or a ‘regime’ in the
more traditional sense of the term and the next section discusses the relationship in more
detail and its wider implications for the governance process.
Table 2 The ODA’s balance scorecard approach to procurement
Element Key Features
Safety and security Health and safety, design, behaviour and culture; security of operations
Equalities and inclusion Promoting equality and diversity; community engagement; inclusive
design; supply chain management; employment, including skills, fair
employment and wages
Environment Environmental responsibility, including waste management and energy
use; ethical sourcing
Quality and functionality Functionality; design impact; construction quality; promoting excellence
and innovation
Legacy Financial viability and whole life cost; ownership and management
structure; community and utilization beneﬁts
Source: ODA (2007: 6)
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Public–private hybridities and the rescaling of political power
The relationship between CLM and the ODA represents a salient example of how
contemporary modes of urban policy governance are structured and how they operate.
The ODA and CLM have taken on interdependent roles and act as both regulators and the
regulated. Each monitors the activities of the other. CLM’s position as a ‘gatekeeper’ for
ODA gives it a particularly significant role in creating a community of shared fate, in
which subcontractors become locked in to a series of conditional obligations. This role
would traditionally have been undertaken by a public sector body, but as the regulatory
environments in which governance is conducted have become increasingly complex, so
the capacities in the public sector to take on significant project management programmes
have diminished. For interviewees the Games has thus become a ‘showcase’
development for professional and lay audiences in cities across the world. As one
influential interviewee noted in a broad-ranging attack on the English Planning System:
there seems to be general astonishment that here in the UK we are able to deliver major capital
projects on time and on budget. It can be done . . . and we’ll be looking to apply that model
globally where we can export the expertise.
The desire to reinforce this message in large part explains the launch of the ODA’s
Learning Legacy programme in October 2011 and its promotion of the Games as a
‘showcase for sustainable, safe and successful construction set to raise the bar of UK
building industry’ (ODA, 2011b: 1).
Contained within such discourses is an implied criticism of the political nature of
the British planning system and its inability to deliver major development projects in
an efficient and effective manner. For ODA respondents the success of the Olympic
developments is ‘to a large degree a result of CLM-ODA working as a true partnership
with a closely aligned set of objectives through the contractual model’. The wider lesson
is what one interviewee described as a ‘wake up call for the UK construction industry.
We can do this and we can use this again for nuclear power, the Crossrail Scheme,4 the
utilities, whatever’. It was also argued that the scope and scale of urban development
projects has mushroomed to the extent that it is no longer possible for projects to be
managed directly by elected government institutions, or directed by an outdated planning
system, such is the regulatory, legal and financial complexity and expertise that is now
required. As one manager noted, ‘you have to manage the risk on the job with multiple
contracts operating at different stages . . . and you need organizations like CLM that can
manage the totality of that’. Or as another put it when asked why delivery could not have
been managed by a public organization, ‘why reinvent the wheel when there are perfectly
good working models in the industry that we could use? Why build an organization from
scratch and assume all of the performance risk when you have UK Plc sitting there with
a level of capability and expertise waiting to be deployed’.
At the same time, however, the private contractor is protected from the risks
associated with unforeseen technical problems or responses made to democratically
articulated demands. These risks are converted into quantifiable, financial ‘compensation
events’ and collectively they represent a significant shift in responsibilities onto the
public sector. The ODA was thus liable for compensation if it ‘gives an instruction
changing the scope and/or scale of the services . . . and does not state in its instruction
that the change applies to the items in a specific Task or Tasks’ (ODA, 2006: 35). Perhaps
more significantly, compensation is also triggered when the ODA ‘changes a decision
which he has previously communicated to the Delivery Partner [or] notifies a correction
to an assumption which he has stated’ (ibid.: 35). These act as a budgetary brake on
changing demands and a financial democratic premium to be paid as and when changes
4 The Crossrail scheme is a project to construct a new heavy-rail train line under Central London that
will connect Heathrow Airport directly with the City of London and the Docklands. It is one of the
biggest civil engineering projects in the EU.
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in policy delivery are required. It also acts as an effective risk transfer mechanism with
CLM able to fix a series of formal tasks and obligations in contractual time that seek to
eliminate the risk posed by future costs and changing circumstances. As with contractual
agreements elsewhere any subsequent post-contractual changes are only valid if they
leave the private company in a ‘no better and no worse’ financial situation than those
agreed at the outset. All price increases, time over-runs and cost increases constitute
a change in the project’s ‘description’ and therefore become compensation events.
Any ‘unanticipated’ change in the law that impacts upon the contract constitutes
a compensation payment, particularly those that relate to employment law and
environmental legislation. Moreover, under the contract, ODA and CLM ‘may make
proposals . . . for methods of incentivising’ the latter’s performance. The establishment
of incentive schedules is left up to the ‘discretion’ of the ODA.
In reality Department for Culture, Media, and Sport (DCMS) figures reveal that
project costs in terms of payments to CLM had increased from £647 million in 2007
to £718 million in 2011 (Government Olympic Executive, 2011). These ‘enhanced
payments’ were justified by ‘the strong progress of the project against agreed milestones
and savings achieved. CLM’s enhanced payments are based on performance and they
are incentivised to drive down costs across the programme’ (Government Olympic
Executive, 2011: 21). Such payments are a recurring feature of privatization programmes
across the UK welfare state and are frequently negotiated into contracts (see Pollock,
2005). In the first months of 2010 four other global firms working on key infrastructure
— Carillion, Lend Lease, Balfour Beatty and ISG — were also paid incentives totalling
£10,170,000 (DCMS, 2010). Such figures give a sense of how resource intensive
privatization through contractualism has become. Expert advice and direct involvement
comes at enormous financial cost to state budgets. The more complex the regulatory and
legal environments in which urban development takes place, the more advice and
expertise is required and the greater the ultimate costs.
The implications of these risk and reward transfers on the democratic process remain
implicit as they encourage a process of detachment between decision making and the
political process. As project managers, CLM’s connections to local communities and
politicians are filtered through the ODA and to a lesser extent the Mayor of London and
the UK government. Responsibility for policy has been handed over to project managers,
with the delivery of the Games converted into a technical programme of action adhering
to specifications and decisions outlined in the contractual phase of the development,
and therefore subject primarily to technical challenges and adaptations, rather than
significant policy objections. It represents a clear example of how decisions become
frozen at a particular point in time to facilitate the development process. It can de facto
and de jure undermine efforts by others to make changes to the planning and design of
the new urban environments and was a point neatly summarized by the ODA’s chief
Executive who told the ODA Board in 2008:
Progress on the Programme meant that scope was now largely fixed, though pressure for some
changes continued, and the emphasis should move to efficient delivery: between now and
December 2009 CLM should have been responsible for expenditure of some £2bn (ODA,
2008: 1).
A freedom of information request shows that as of November 2011 there were no
disputes between ODA and CLM that required intervention from an official dispute
resolution panel, indicating a degree of consensus in the delivery of the contract and an
elision of public and private sector interests and ways of working. However, it could also
indicate that the terms and conditions of the contract are very beneficial to CLM and
there has been no need to contest mounting costs as the risks fall disproportionately onto
the public sector. By ‘taking the politics out’ of the development process, privatization
and hybrid formation has shielded those involved in delivering the Games’ infrastructure
from the wider controversies that their actions have caused in East London and beyond
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and made it less clear how decisions over spending and risk transfer have been arrived at.
It is also indicative of the wider point made earlier in the article that private sector elites
have become adept at capturing state contracts. In the desire to create level ‘playing
fields’ for private sector competition there is a growing liberty cost in which control over
spending and finance become less explicit, even if this means that the outcomes of policy
run counter to wider stated aims and public demands.
This is exemplified by recently released government statistics on the distribution of tier
1 Olympic contracts and their combined value, as shown in Tables 3 and 4. They show a
concentration of benefits going to firms registered in London and the South East who have
taken 65.9% of the contracts with a combined value of £3.965 billion. Other parts of the
UK have received very little in the way of spending, with Welsh-based firms, for example,
only obtaining 0.01% of the total amount. The figures demonstrate how governments can
lose control of their own spending as in the words of the UK’s former sports minister Hugh
Robertson (2010: 13), ‘all contracts have to be competed for on a commercial basis . . .
there are strict rules that govern that . . . we cannot simply award contracts to one part of
the country because it has not had enough of them before’. In other words, commercial
contractualism and regulatory capitalism prevent states from targeting their spending to
where elected representatives and publics believe it should be spent. In the case of the
London Olympics there has ostensibly been a reverse form of regional policy that transfers
government spending indirectly from areas of need to areas of growth.
However, there is further confusion over where the spending then goes, indicating a
further loss of control and accountability. These figures almost certainly underplay the
extent to which London-based firms are acting as conduits for multinational companies,
some of whom could be exporting their profits to tax-efficient subsidiary and holding
companies across the world (see Shaxson, 2011). But even more significantly the
subcontracting process below tier 1 contracts becomes a ‘commercial matter’, subject
to commercial confidentiality. The ODA has no way of knowing how the £5.6 billion it
has expended through contracts is ultimately distributed spatially or between different
Table 3 Number of ODA contracts awarded to ﬁrms located
in the regions of the UK, 2006–11
Regions No. of Suppliers %
East Midlands 44 3.0
East of England 135 9.4
London 726 50.7
North East 21 1.5
North West 53 3.7
South East 218 15.2
South West 60 4.2
West Midlands 58 4.1
Yorkshire and Humber 40 2.8
England total 1,355 94.6
Northern Ireland 5 0.35
Scotland 25 1.7
Wales 11 0.8
Overseas 37 2.6
Total 1,433
Source: Adapted from figures from DCMS (2010: column 56W)
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industrial sectors. By instigating forms of regulatory capitalism, governments cede
control over such matters to the vagaries of commercial processes and surrender their
right to determine how and where state money should be spent. The implications for
spatial and urban policy are, of course, enormous. Demands over the fair allocation of
spending continue to be made to governments and politicians at the same time as their
ability to act is being eroded through wider state-led processes of privatization and
political reform.
Conclusions: towards a ‘London model’ of development?
The article has argued that the contractual processes involved in the delivery of the
London Games reflect and reproduce wider changes in the governance and management
of urban projects in the UK and beyond. While much academic and policy work
highlights the ‘uniqueness’ of the event, this article has argued that its delivery reflects
and reproduces wider changes taking place in the political economy of global capitalism
and a process of what might be termed state-led privatization. It represents a primary
example of governance through contract, or a system of project implementation that is
underpinned by institutional and regulatory networks. A new reproducible London model
of development is actively being promoted by the UK government and Olympic bodies
that emphasizes the benefits to be had from the employment of management and
regulatory practices (see Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2012). If what matters is
what works, then the delivery of the Olympic infrastructure constitutes a successful
governance model. The complex requirement to host the Games, founded on the loosely
articulated priorities set out in the bidding document, has been converted into a
disciplined and costed project. It represents a significant management achievement and
if governance is to be defined through its (in)effectiveness then it represents good
governance at its most profound. Given the scale and complexity of contemporary urban
Table 4 Total value of contracts awarded to ﬁrms in the
regions of the UK, 2006–11
Regions
Total contract value
£ %
East Midlands 271,823,439 4.8
East of England 719,818,580 12.8
London 3,148,804,475 56.0
North East 9,644,108 0.2
North West 97,055,679 1.7
South East 816,822,052 14.5
South West 9,557,345 0.2
West Midlands 425,371,681 7.6
Yorkshire and Humber 66,407,039 1.2
England total 5,565,304,398 99.09
Northern Ireland 17,094,646 0.3
Scotland 23,367,258 0.4
Wales 668,663 0.01
Overseas 12,224,949 0.2
Total 5,618,659,914
Source: Adapted from figures from DCMS (2010: column 70W)
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projects such as this, there is clearly a powerful logic to the handing over of project
management to experts from the private sector, who are able to mobilize their own
networks and capacities in line with project delivery demands.
The discussion has illustrated the sophistication of these regulatory and legal networks
and the importance of contractual detail in shaping the contours of development, and by
extension urban political processes. For project champions this is not something to be
criticized but celebrated as a utopian governance solution to the financial and managerial
problems faced by public agencies (see Lythaby and Mead, 2011). It is interesting to note
that the Rio Olympics of 2016 will also be using an ODA, drawn on the London experience
(see Municipality of Rio, 2010). However, the implications go beyond urban policy. In a
context of ‘austerity governance’ across the global North, governments are increasingly
looking to private sector sources of finance for infrastructure projects at all scales and a
London model could provide an important benchmark for future projects. And as the
article has pointed out, the paradox of a private-led model is that it increases costs to the
state rather than tackling imagined funding gaps. The more complex a project and the more
onerous the regulatory requirements placed on private developers, the greater the business
opportunities for elite firms and investors.
However, the study has also demonstrated that these physical developments have come
at a price, in terms of democratic accountability, or what Levi-Faur (2011) terms a ‘liberty
cost’. The more complex the legal and technical arrangements surrounding a development,
the more difficult it becomes to identify the location of power and decision making. The
discussion has shown how much of the governance process was effectively privatized in
the handing over of responsibilities from the ODA to the consortium CLM. This de facto
relegated community engagement and political processes to that of a ‘risk factor’, to be
calculated as part of the wider ‘risk environment’ of project delivery. Political demands
become something to be mitigated, controlled and managed rather than embraced. Indeed,
politics is re-placed and re-characterized as an ‘event’ or ‘moment’ in which discussions
were held over the original decision to bid. Project implementation was then boiled down
to a series of legal and contractual steps to be taken, underpinned by the ‘objectives’set out
by policymakers at the beginning of the process. The article has highlighted the ways in
which risk registers are used as a form of pre-emptive governance, with lawyers and
experts given the responsibility to identify how and where they are to occur, how they are
to be mitigated and whose role it is to ensure that such processes are monitored and
delivered. Decision making was therefore moved ‘upstream’, where it has been fixed and
‘locked in’ in ways that prevent significant changes later on. If policy production is
fragmented and decoupled from the democratic process in this way, then the implications
for the implementation of wider policy demands for issues such as social justice and/or
sustainability are highly significant.
This in turn opens up broader epistemological questions over the types of knowledge
required to explain and make sense of contemporary development processes in cities and
our understandings of what modern states have become. It may be that there has been an
extension in what Hall and Biersteker (2002) term global private law; that is, the
existence of a parallel set of decision-making mechanisms and structures alongside those
that exist in formal public politics. As Riles (2008) shows, it is increasingly common for
firms in high-knowledge sectors to develop their own systems of exchange based on
informal or private regulation. Often, she argues, it is through a greater understanding
of how these parallel networks operate that explanations for the form and character
of policy interventions are to be found. Moreover, such practices are more grounded
in local social relations than is often assumed and ‘encompass diverse and even at
times contradictory subjects, ideologies, and practices’ (Riles, 2005: 976). In urban
development projects there is an urgent need to develop understandings of how
such private shadow networks operate, what they consist of, and how they influence
development. There is also an enhanced need to develop methodological approaches that
make sense of the accountancy practices of regulatory capitalism and shed light on where
the money from major state-funded projects ends up.
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Moreover, we need to better understand the geographies of such processes and what
the implications are for the politics of demands. It may be that ‘public interests’ become
the focus of contractual negotiations between and within technocratic elites, funded by
public and private sector agencies. Citizens and communities may be increasingly forced
to look to alternative modes of resistance, away from the formal political system. These
could include judicial reviews and the use of legislation to challenge policy decisions
(see Biehl et al., 2009 and Rios-Figueroa and Taylor, 2006 for a wider discussion of
the process of policy ‘judicialization’). Traditional representative democracy, and even
participative representation as understood in recent proclamations of good governance,
may be becoming less significant as the location of politics shifts to ever more
technocratic domains. The article has sought to develop some understanding of how elite
power is channelled into the ‘contractual capture’ of state spending on urban projects and
then enforced through a complex set of regulatory procedures and structures operating
from the global to the local scale. Implications for the future of urban policy, our
understandings of how globalization works and even the very nature of urban democracy
are potentially profound.
Mike Raco (m.raco@ucl.ac.uk), Bartlett School of Planning, University College London,
Wates House Gordon Street, London WC1H 0QB, UK.
References
Ayres, I. and J. Braithwaite (2000) Responsive
regulation: transcending the deregulation
debate. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Bentley, D. and G. Rafferty (1992) Project
management: keys to success. Civil
Engineering 62.4, 58.
Beriatos, E. and A. Gospodini (2004)
‘Glocalising’ urban landscapes: Athens
and the 2004 Olympics. Cities 21.3,
187–202.
Biehl, J., A. Petryna, A. Gertner, J.J. Amon
and P.D. Picon (2009) Judicialization of
the right to health in Brazil. The Lancet
373.9682, 2182–4.
Blair, T. (2010) A journey. Hutchinson,
London.
Braithwaite, J. (1999) Accountability and
governance under the new regulatory
state. Australian Journal of Public
Administration 58.1, 90–7.
Braithwaite, J. (2008) Regulatory capitalism
— how it works, ideas for making it work
better. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham.
Brownill, S. and B. Kochan (2011) London
Docklands looking back, looking forwards.
Town and Country Planning 48, 445–8.
Clarke, J. (2008) Living with/in and without
neo-liberalism. Focaal — European
Journal of Anthropology 51.1, 135–47.
Coe, S. (2005) Deighton named new CEO.
The Telegraph [WWW document]. URL
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/2370009/
Deighton-named-London-2012-CEO.html
(accessed 3 December 2011).
Crouch, C. (2011) The strange non-death of
neo-liberalism. Polity Press, Cambridge.
Cutler, C. (2010) The legitimacy of private
transnational governance: experts and
the transnational market for force.
Socioeconomic Review 8.1, 157–85.
DCMS (Department for Culture, Media, and
Sport) (2010) Sport and society: the
Summer Olympics through the lens of
social science. HMSO, London.
England, K. and K. Ward (eds.) (2007)
Neoliberalisation: states, networks,
peoples. Blackwell, Oxford.
Flyvbjerg, B., N. Bruzelius and W.
Rothengatte (2003) Megaprojects and risk:
an anatomy of ambition. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2012)
The London 2012 Olympics [WWW
document]. URL http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/
global-issues/london-2012/ (accessed 11
May 2012).
Francis, J. and M. Yu (2007) The effect of big
four office size on audit quality [WWW
document]. URL http://leeds-faculty.
colorado.edu/gunny/WorkshopSeries/
Papers0708/Francis.pdf (accessed 3
December 2011).
Gamble, A. (1988) The free economy and the
strong state. Macmillan, Basingstoke.
State-led privatization and the London Olympics 2012 195
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 38.1
© 2013 The Author. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. 9600
Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main St, Malden, MA 02148, USA on behalf of Urban Research
Publications Limited
Giddens, A. (2007) Over to you, Mr Brown.
Polity Press, Cambridge.
Giddens, A. (2009) The politics of climate
change. Polity Press, Cambridge.
Girginov, V. and L. Hills (2009) The political
process of constructing a sustainable
London Olympics sports development
legacy. International Journal of Sport
Policy 1.2, 161–81.
Gold, J. and M. Gold (2008) Olympic cities:
regeneration, city rebranding and changing
urban agendas. Geography Compass 2.1,
300–18.
Gospodini, A. (2009) Post-industrial
trajectories of Mediterranean European
cities: the case of post-Olympics Athens.
Urban Studies 46.5, 1157–86.
Government Olympic Executive (2011)
London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic
Games annual report February 2011.
DCMS, London.
Hall, R. and T. Biersteker (2002) The
emergence of private authority in the
international system. In R. Hall and T.
Biersteker (eds.), The emergence of private
authority in global governance, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge.
Hansard (2008) Olympic Games: consultants,
4 November, column 282W [WWW
document]. URL http://www.
publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/
cmhansrd/cm081104/text/81104w0012.htm
(10 June 2012).
Harvey, D. (2009) Cosmopolitanism and the
geographies of freedom. Columbia
University Press, New York.
Imrie, R. and M. Raco (eds.) (2003) Urban
renaissance? Policy Press, Bristol.
Imrie, R. and E. Street (2009) Regulating
design: the practices of architecture,
governance and control. Urban Studies
46.12, 2507–711.
IOC (2005) Host city contract — Games of
XXX Olympiad in 2012. International
Olympic Committee, Lausanne [WWW
document]. URL http://www.games
monitor.org.uk/files/Host%20City%20
Contract.pdf (accessed 15 June 2012).
IOC (2010a) Report of the IOC Evaluation
Commission for the Games of the XXX
Olympiad 2012. International Olympic
Committee, Lausanne.
IOC (2010b) The Olympic Charter.
International Olympic Committee,
Lausanne.
Jordana, J. and D. Levi-Faur (2005) The
diffusion of regulatory capitalism in Latin
America sectoral and national channels in
the making of new order. Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social
Science 598.1, 102–24.
Kipfer, S. and R. Keil (2002) Toronto Inc?
Planning the competitive city in the New
Toronto. Antipode 34.2, 227–64.
Levi-Faur, D. (2005) The global diffusion of
regulatory capitalism. Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social
Science 598.1, 12–32.
Levi-Faur, D. (2011) Regulation and
regulatory governance. In D. Levi-Faur
(ed.), Handbook on the politics of
regulation, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham.
Levi-Faur, D. and S. Gilad (2004) The British
regulatory state — transcending the
privatisation debate. Comparative Politics
37.1, 105–24.
London Assembly (2007) London Olympic
Games and Paralympic Games: the
employment and skills legacy. Greater
London Authority, London.
Lythaby, M. and J. Mead (2011) Supply chain
management — insolvency management
— learning legacy 2012 [WWW
document]. URL http://learninglegacy.
london2012.com/documents/pdfs/
procurement-and-supply-chain-
management/192-insolvency-mngmt-
pcsm.pdf (accessed 3 December 2011).
Meyer, M. (2008) The last days of old
Beijing: life in the vanishing backstreets of
a city transformed. Bloomsbury Press,
London.
Moran, M. (2003) The British regulatory
state: high modernism and
hyper-innovation. Oxford University Press,
Oxford.
Municipality of Rio (2010) Technical report
for the Rio Olympic Games 2016.
Municipality of Rio, Rio de Janeiro.
Murphy, R. (2011) The courageous state —
rethinking economics, society, and the role
of government. Searching Finance Ltd,
London.
Olds, K. (1998) Urban mega-events, evictions
and housing rights: the Canadian case.
Current Issues in Tourism 1.1, 2–46.
ODA (2006) Delivery contract for the
London 2012 Olympics. Olympic Delivery
Authority, London.
ODA(2007) Sustainable development
strategy. Olympic Delivery Authority,
London.
ODA (2008) Minutes of 28th board meeting:
24 July 2008. Olympic Delivery Authority
196 Mike Raco
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 38.1
© 2013 The Author. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. 9600
Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main St, Malden, MA 02148, USA on behalf of Urban Research
Publications Limited
[WWW document]. URL http://www.
london2012.com/documents/oda-board/
final-summarised-minutes-of-28th-board-
meeting-july-08.pdf (10 October 2011).
ODA (2011a) The Olympic Delivery
Authority [WWW document]. URL
http://www.london2012.com/about-us/
the-people-delivering-the-games/
the-olympic-delivery-authority/ (10
October 2011).
ODA (2011b) Learning legacy: London 2012
showcase for sustainable, safe and
successful construction set to raise the bar
of UK building industry. Olympic Delivery
Authority [WWW document]. URL http://
www.london2012.com/press/media-
releases/2011/10/learning-legacy-london-
2012-showcase-for-sustainable-saf.php
(accessed 10 October 2011).
Peck, J. (2005) Struggling with the creative
class. International Journal of Urban and
Regional Research 29.4, 740–70.
Pollock, A. (2005) NHS Plc. — the
privatisation of our health care. Verso,
London.
Power, M. (1999) The Audit Society.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Poynter, G. (2009) The 2012 Olympics and
the re-shaping of East London. In R.
Imrie, L. Lees and M. Raco (eds.),
Regenerating London — governance,
sustainability, and community in a global
city, Routledge, London.
Raco, M. and E. Tunney (2010) Visibilities
and invisibilities in urban development:
small business communities and the
London Olympics 2012. Urban Studies
47.10, 2069–91.
Ramia, G. (2002) The ‘new contractualism’,
social protection and the Yeatman thesis.
Journal of Sociology 38.1, 49–68.
Riles, A. (2005) A new agenda for the cultural
study of law: taking on the technicalities.
Buffalo Law Review 53, 973–1033.
Riles, A. (2008) The anti-network: private
global governance, legal knowledge, and
the legitimacy of the state. Journal of
Comparative Law 56.3, 605–30.
Rios-Figueroa, J. and M. Taylor (2006)
Institutional determinants of the
judicialisation of policy in Brazil and
Mexico. Journal of Latin American Studies
38.4, 739–66.
Robertson, H. (2010) Response to
parliamentary question 20 January 2011.
In Department for Culture, Media, and
Sport (DCMS), Sport and society: the
summer Olympics through the lens of
social science, HMSO, London.
Sassen, S. (2002) The state and globalisation.
In R. Hall and T. Biersteker (eds.), The
emergence of private authority in global
governance, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge.
Scharpf, F. (1999). Governing in Europe:
effective and democratic? Oxford
University Press, Oxford.
Shaxson, N. (2011) Treasure islands — tax
havens and the men who stole the world.
The Bodley Head, London.
Sheppard, E. and H. Leitner (2010) Quo
Vadis neoliberalism? The remaking of
global capitalist governance after the
Washington consensus. Geoforum 41.2,
185–94.
Surborg, B., R. VanWynsberghe and E. Wyly
(2008) Mapping the Olympic growth
machine: transnational urbanism and the
growth machine diaspora. City 12.3,
341–55.
Swyngedouw, E. (2009) The zero-ground of
politics: musings on the post-political city.
New Geographies 1.1, 52–61.
Toronto Star (2010) Lessons for G20 security
from the Vancouver Olympics [WWW
document]. URL http://www.thestar.com/
news/torontog20summit/article/820332–
lessons-for-g20-security-from-vancouver-
olympics (accessed 10 May 2012).
Tufts, S. (2003) Building the ‘competitive
city’: Labour and Toronto’s bid to host the
Olympic Games. Geoforum 35.1, 47–58.
VanWynsberghe, R., B. Surborg and E. Wyly
(2012) When the Games come to town:
neoliberalism, mega-events and social
inclusion in the Vancouver 2010 Winter
Olympic Games. International Journal of
Urban and Regional Research. Published
online 11 February 2012. URL http://
onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/
j.1468-2427.2012.01105.x/abstract.
Vigor, A., M. Mean, and C. Tims (eds.)
(2004) After the goldrush? A sustainable
Olympics for London. IPPR/Demos,
London.
Wacquant, L. (2008) Urban outcasts: a
comparative sociology of advanced
marginality. Polity Press, Cambridge.
Waltzer, M. (1984) Liberalism and the art of
separation. Political Theory 12.3, 315–30.
Yeatman, A. (1995) Interpreting contemporary
contractualism. In J. Boston (ed.), The
state under contract, Bridget Williams
Books, Wellington.
State-led privatization and the London Olympics 2012 197
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 38.1
© 2013 The Author. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. 9600
Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main St, Malden, MA 02148, USA on behalf of Urban Research
Publications Limited
